Low-cost group rekeying for unattended wireless sensor networks by Hernández Serrano, Juan et al.
Low-cost group rekeying for unattended wireless sensor networks
Juan Herna´ndez-Serrano • Juan Vera-del-Campo •
Josep Pegueroles • Carlos Gan˜a´n
Published online: 25 May 2012
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
Abstract Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are made up
of large groups of nodes that perform distributed moni-
toring services. Since sensor measurements are often sen-
sitive data acquired in hostile environments, securing WSN
becomes mandatory. However, WSNs consists of low-end
devices and frequently preclude the presence of a central-
ized security manager. Therefore, achieving security is
even more challenging. State-of-the-art proposals rely on:
(1) attended and centralized security systems; or (2)
establishing initial keys without taking into account how to
efficiently manage rekeying. In this paper we present a
scalable group key management proposal for unattended
WSNs that is designed to reduce the rekeying cost when
the group membership changes.
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1 Introduction
One of the main characteristics of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) is the cooperation of the participants in order to
collect and provide useful sensed information of a certain
scenario. However, the wireless nature of WSNs makes the
information flow easily accessible by anyone in the vicin-
ity. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a secure com-
munication channel between sensor nodes where no
attacker can eavesdrop, modify, replay, or inject messages.
This is what is called group security, which is targeted to
provide group privacy, since data should be protected just
from outsiders, and group authentication, since the only
sources of communication should be the members of the
group. In order to achieve this goal, every member knows a
set of keys that are usually classified as: keys shared by two
nodes or pairwise keys, and keys shared between group
nodes or groupwise keys. Pairwise keys allow secure
routing by hop-by-hop encryption and authentication, and
provide easy isolation of a kidnapped member since com-
promised keys are just not used anymore. On the other
hand, groupwise keys allow secure routing without the
need of costly hop-by-hop encryption but providing hop-
by-hop authentication and integrity (checking message
authentication codes at every link). However groupwise
keys are not resilient against node kidnapping and thus
must be updated whenever a member is compromised.
Nevertheless both types of keys are part of a vicious circle
if asymmetric cryptography is not used: in order to securely
agree on pairwise keys, nodes need a preshared secret that
it is often the groupwise key; and in order to securely
update a groupwise key, secure communications must be
provided often by means of uncompromised pairwise keys.
Group key management (GKM) studies the generation
and updating of the aforementioned keying material during
the entire group life [34]. GKM thus guarantees that only
the current group members can authenticate and understand
or decrypt messages within the group. The main challenge
of GKM implies the securely update and distribution of the
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keying material whenever a new member joins the group or
a member leaves or is expelled from the group. Obviously,
in order to expel a member, a previous detection of mis-
behavior, malfunction or impersonation is needed. This is
studied in another branch of research, complementary to
the study of GKM, mostly focused on intrusion detection
systems (IDS) [16].
Since WSNs are devoted to provide sensed data,
detection of misbehaving or compromised nodes in
WSNs is mainly the case of outlier detection [38], often
also known as anomaly detection or deviation detection.
Outliers can be defined as ‘‘those measurements that
significantly deviate from the normal pattern of sensed
data’’ [7]. The identification of outlier sources in WSNs
have been addressed in several research topics, being the
main ones fault detection [8, 36], event detection [20, 25]
and intrusion detection [9, 37]. To the best of our
knowledge, there is still room for improvement and
additional work. However, its study is out of the scope of
this contribution.
We are certain that the application of known GKM
techniques to WSN can secure the exchanged critical data
while incurring a low impact on network performance.
However, many WSNs, such as the unattended WSNs
(UWSNs), preclude the fixed presence of a centralized
data-collection point, which usually manages group secu-
rity [2, 14, 26]. Within this unattended nature, a secure
distributed cooperation framework for sharing data,
resources and/or services between the UWSN members
becomes mandatory. Distributively guarantying GKM for
UWSNs thus arises as a very challenging task.
In this paper we present a distributed, unattended, self-
organized GKM protocol specifically suited to low-end
devices. One of the main targets of our proposal is to
reduce the added energy consumption due to securing the
group. This is why the presented protocol is designed to
minimize the computational costs and, especially, the
necessary transmitted messages, which in fact incur the
highest energy costs [24].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Prior to
detailing our protocol, in Sect. 2 we discuss the ongoing
work on securing UWSN and the motivation of our pro-
posal. Then, in Sect. 3 we describe the process for dis-
tributively creating a secure group. How to secure and
efficiently manage the group dynamics due to losses,
leavings and joinings is detailed in Sects. 4 and 5. Next, in
Sect. 6, we evaluate both analytically and by simulation our
protocol at the application layer. Section 7 is an exercise
that shows how to apply the previous results in a realistic
physical-layer scenario. In Sect. 8, we present a compari-
son with similar state-of-the-art proposals. Finally, in Sect.
9, we summarize the conclusions and future work related to
these topics.
2 Related work and motivation
Most of current distributed GKM proposals in the literature
for UWSNs focus on generating the necessary group keys
from a set of predistributed keying material [5, 6, 11, 12,
21, 32, 39]. In all these proposals the process of securely
agreeing on a common group key is either a decentralized
heavy process, or relies on a powerful central base station,
or it is not provided at all. With regard to UWSN, the first
is the only option. Consequently, an efficient rekeying
scheme is mandatory to avoid a costly repetition of the
initial group creation every time the membership changes.
This fact is especially unsuitable for common sensor nodes
which have limited computational resources and battery;
not to mention how worse the situation becomes when the
group is very large. Therefore, distributed GKM techniques
focusing on rekeying efficiency with an autonomous ability
to regenerate the group (unattended creation/updating of
the group keying material) must be provided.
Considering that most of the energy consumption in
WSNs owes to the transmission of a message over a
wireless channel (reaching up to 3 orders of magnitude [24]
more than processing), any GKM proposal for WSNs must
be designed to minimize the number of messages that have
to be transmitted for rekeying. The most successful pro-
posals for reducing the rekeying problem order are, even
nowadays, based on the old well-studied logical tree hier-
archies of key-encryption keys (KEKs) [14, 30, 34]. The
simplest method for providing group security is merely
based on the use of a groupwise key shared by all the group
members, so-called the networkwise key or group key or
session encryption key (SEK). This key allows every group
member to: (1) send encrypted data; (2) decrypt received
data, and (3) authenticate itself as a group member since
the knowledge of the session key guarantees that it belongs
to the group. However, in order to securely update the SEK
when the group membership changes, some other keys are
necessary, so-called KEKs. These KEKs are organized into
logical trees that actually improve the rekeying efficiency
in terms of bandwidth and latency. In this kind of methods,
a key server builds a KEK tree only known to it and assigns
a subset of the tree KEKs to each of the members of the
group. This subset is made of the keys that correspond to
the tree nodes in the path from the leaves—where the
members are—to the tree root. When a member leaves or
joins a group, only the KEKs belonging to that member
need to be changed. Then, new keys are delivered to the
remaining members and the tree is reconstructed using the
unchanged keys. In short, the cost of rekeying is reduced
from O(N) to O(L), with N the number of members and
L the depth of the tree.
As the number of necessary messages for rekeying
depends on L, tree-based algorithms are more efficient
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when L gets its minimum value. And this is the case of a
balanced tree (all leaves at the same level or at most
between two adjacent levels) where the depth of the tree is
exactly logx N with x the maximum number of nodes
hanging from a given node (commonly x = 2 which leads
to binary trees). The need for balanced trees has been well
studied and many protocols [22, 29] have dealt with it.
However, none of the previous proposals fulfills the
requirement of unattended operation since they rely on
fixed always available centralized security servers. There-
fore, providing unattended tree-based GKM proposals is
challenging.
In [15] a GKM protocol that used logical key trees
constructed from the contributions of all network members
is presented. This proposal fulfills the two main design
objectives of GKM used in wireless ad hoc networks: (1) it
minimizes the cost of updating keying material, and (2) it
resolves the first objective by implementing a distributed
GKM system based on peer relations (peer-to-peer, P2P) in
which every group member contributes. However, [15]
does not take care of very low-end devices, such as sensor
nodes, in which every step forward in resource savings, no
matter how small, is of paramount importance; in which
even the necessary rekeying when the membership changes
could lead to exhausting network nodes. The new proposal
described here is intended for wireless ad hoc networks
with low-end devices, such as WSNs. Therefore, besides
minimizing the required messages for rekeying, we use
symmetric cryptography instead of asymmetric cryptogra-
phy to reduce the cost of the new protocol and provide new
‘‘low-cost’’ methods for authentication and pairwise
agreement.
In short, below we present a distributed, unattended,
self-organized protocol that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, is the only one allowing to secure a large group of
nodes in a distributed, unattended, self-organizing man-
ner, and which is specifically suitable for devices with
resource constraints, such as sensor nodes, since it min-
imizes both the necessary transmitted messages, as it is
based on logical trees of keys, and the computational
costs, as only makes use of symmetric cryptography.
Since the use of a GKM protocol allows to maintain
group security, it is actually a basic tenet for guaran-
teeing confidentiality and group authentication. Hence,
the proposed protocol can securely distribute the neces-
sary keying material for protecting the WSN against the
following attacks by an external attacker: eavesdropping
(messages are encrypted), modification (message authen-
tication codes allow to check integrity of received mes-
sages), replay (as long as the message authentication
codes use some kind of timestamps), and/or injection of
messages (no valid packets can be generated without
knowing the current keys).
To the extent of our research, there are three proposals
in the state of the art [10, 15, 19] that apply logical trees of
KEKs to implement a GKM protocol in a self-organizing
scenario. The main differences between them and our
approach are:
1. In [15, 19], asymmetric cryptography is used for
authentication and key agreement. On the contrary, our
proposal only uses symmetric cryptography, which
requires less computational power.
2. In [10], the rekeying can be an unattended operation,
but the creation of the secure group needs to be
managed by a centralized powerful node. On the other
hand, our proposal extends the unattended operation
even to the creation of the secure group.
3 Initial deployment of the secure group
Before the group is deployed, the base station (or gateway)
offline generates an initial group key Kg and decides the
value of parameter k that, as we will detail in Sect. 5,
represents the maximum number of new members that can
be registered in the group after the deployment. Then, the
base station preloads every node/member with a groupwise
symmetrical key or SEK that is the result of applying
k one-way hash functions to the initial group key Kg as in
(1) with H the selected hash function.
Kkg ¼ HðK
k1
g Þ k [ 1
HðKgÞ k ¼ 0

ð1Þ
As aforementioned, a secure UWSN can run with just
the use of a SEK for group-secure routing. Nevertheless,
when a node is kidnapped, the SEK is compromised, and,
in order to isolate such kidnapped node and guarantying
secure rekeying, pairwise keys are also needed for hop-by-
hop encryption. As a result, besides providing a group key
management scheme (see Sect. 3.2), every node must agree
a pairwise key with all the nodes with whom it has direct
visibility at the link layer (see Sect. 3.1). From now on we
will call these nodes as neighbors.
3.1 Agreement of pairwise keys
Pairwise key agreement schemes either use a preloaded
shared secret or require the collaboration of a trusted third
party (e.g., SNEP [31]). Our proposal is designed to unat-
tended networks that consequently do not have access to
external trusted third parties; therefore, it relies on the
preloaded shared secret approach. This shared secret is the
current SEK, which, at a first stage, is preloaded into every
group member (Kg
k), and then updated to the new agreed
SEKs as detailed in Sect. 3.2.
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The process of securely agreeing a pairwise key is as
follows. Each member u computes a key Ku = fSEK(I-
Du, su) before the secure group is established; where f is a
one-way cryptographic function based on key the initial
SEK, IDu is the node identifier, and su is a timestamp that
guarantees key freshness. Then, the pairwise key agree-
ment between member A an member B is: (1) A sends
IDA, sA, K
A to B and vice-versa B sends IDB, sB, K
B to A;
(2) both A and B authenticate the received data by using the
shared SEK in order to check KA and KB respectively; (3) A
and B agree a shared key as KAB ¼ fKBðIDAÞ.
Generation of pairwise keys is needed for hop-by-hop
encryption whenever a sensor node is kidnapped, but it will
not be necessary at all for the rest of the initial creation
phase. Once the group has been established (see Sect. 3.2),
the SEK is updated to the new updated group key and thus
the pairwise keys cannot be compromised.
3.2 Creating the logical tree of KEKs
The logical KEK tree used in this proposal is generated
from cooperation of the sensor nodes and thus it is created
in a bottom-up manner: every KEK is generated as a
function of the KEKs associated to the underlying nodes.
Consequently, we define the key associated to a node (i, j)
as in expression (2). With i, the depth (row) in the tree;
j, the column position within row i (see the logical tree of
KEKs in Fig. 1); L, the depth of the tree; g(), an unidi-
rectional function that it is used to blind the keys; f(), a
combinatorial function; and random(), a random function
used to create the keys associated to the leaf nodes (the
group members).
Ki;j ¼ f ðgðKiþ1;2jÞ; gðKiþ1;2jþ1ÞÞ 0 i\L0 j\2i

ð2Þ
Ki;j ¼ randomði; jÞ i ¼ L0 j\2i

ð3Þ
As in every tree based GKM scheme, each member must
be able to calculate all of the tree keys from the leaf node
where it is placed to the root of the tree. Consequently, every
member must know both its key and the blinded keys of
every sibling node in its path to the root. For example,
consider the tree in Fig. 1, M1 must know its own KEK K3,0
and the blinded KEKs g(K3,1), g(K2,1) and g(K1,1) in order
to calculate its necessary tree KEKs as: K2,0 = f(g(K3,0),
g(K3,1)), K1,0 = f(g(K2,0), g(K2,1)) and K0,0 = f(g(K1,0),
g(K1,1)).
In general terms, the creation of the secure group works
as follows:
1. Every sensor node broadcasts a unique identifier to its
neighbors that from now on we will call it weight1.
Once all the weights have been sent, each node knows
its one-hop neighbors.
2. The nodes start the association by pairs. After asso-
ciation, a key is created and shared by both incum-
bents, and the node with highest weight becomes the
leader of the pair. At this moment every pair of nodes
forms a logical tree of KEKs with depth 1. The weight
of the formed trees is the sum of its members’ weights.
3. Pair leaders start to associate forming groups of four
nodes. Consequently, a new key is created and shared
by all of the four members of the group and the
member with highest weight is the new leader. At this
moment every set of four nodes forms a logical tree of
KEKs with depth 2.
4. Next, (leaders of) groups of four nodes start the
association into sets of eight nodes with a new shared
key (a logical tree of KEKs with depth 3). The
association process is repeated time and again until an
only logical binary tree of keys is created.
5. Once the group has been established, the SEK is updated
to K0,0 and thus Kg
k is no longer needed but to
authenticate new member joinings as detailed in Sect. 5.
The leaders of every subset or group formed during the
tree creation, group leaders (GLs) from now on, manage
the association process, which is just the generation of a
shared key by means of interchanging the blinded keys of
both incumbents as in expression (2).
In order to guarantee that the process leads to an almost
balanced tree of KEKs, the protocol tends to avoid asso-
ciation between trees of very different depths. Let us
denote ai as the association priority of the group leaded by
member i. Then, ai is a 3-tuple made up of (depth of tree
leaded by i, weight of tree leaded by i, weight of i).
Fig. 1 Logical tree of KEKs
1 The reason of calling it weight is to leave an open door for future
research on how different unique weight assignments affect the
protocol performance. Anyhow, in the simplest implementation, the
weight is just a random unique identifier.
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Elements ai can be ordered in a strict ascendant fashion
following the next criterion: ai [ aj V i = j if and only if
the tree depth of group leaded by i is less than the tree
depth of group leaded by j; and, in case of tie, the tree
weight of group leaded by i is greater than the tree weight
of group leaded by j; and, in case of tie, the weight of i is
greater than weight of j.
Consequently, the GL of group with highest association
priority within its neighboring groups will try to associate
with the GL of its neighboring group with the next highest
association priority; the rest of neighboring GLs just wait to
be the ones with highest priority. Once associated, the new
created group has less association priority since the depth of
its tree has been increased in one level. As a result, other
neighboring trees, which would be waiting, start to associate.
One of the most important aspects to assess is the pro-
tocol convergence. That is to say, the protocol has no
deadlocks. As already explained, every GL is either asso-
ciating or awaiting the action of another GL; if all GLs are
in a waiting state, deadlock occurs.
Proposition 1 If the weight of a node is a unique iden-
tifier, then the protocol has no deadlocks.
Proof The uniqueness property of the assigned weights
(unique identifiers) implies also uniqueness of ai values
since ai ¼ aj $ i ¼ j: Consequently, we can create a totally
strict ordered set A of the different values of ai with i 2
½1; M; MN the number of neighboring GLs, and N the
total number of sensor nodes deployed. The order criterion is
the relation ‘\’ or ‘less than’; then ai \ ai?1 V i \ M. h
Deadlock occurs if all GLs are in a waiting state, that is
to say that all GLs have a neighboring GL with highest
association priority, or that for every ai 2 A at least another
aj 2 A with i = j exists such that ai \ aj. However, we
cannot find any ai [ aM since, because of the transitive
property of the ’[’ operator, aM [ ai V i \ M. As a result,
deadlock cannot occur.
For a more in depth understanding of the protocol,
Fig. 2 depicts the flowchart of every node’s operation
during the creation of the secure group. The three types of
messages used by the protocol are: report_msg, used to
send member/tree information to the neighboring leaders;
req_msg, used to request association to a neighboring
leader; ack_msg, used to acknowledge a requested associ-
ation; and neighbor_msg, that the nodes use to share their
neighboring groups with their GL.
3.2.1 Example of operation
For the sake of clarity, we next summarize the overall
behavior of the protocol with an example. Figures 3, 4
and 5 show an example of creation of a secure group in
three iterations. The numbers represent each member
identifier/weight; and the lines between members repre-
sent direct visibility at the link layer. [A, B, C] represents
the group formed by members A, B and C. Ki,j
u is the key
at depth i and position j in the tree of the group leaded
by u.
3.2.1.1 First iteration First of all, each node publishes its
weight to its neighbors by sending a local (one-hop)
broadcast message. After that, every node knows its one-
hop neighbors. Now, the first iteration of the protocol
proceeds as follows (see Fig. 3). Initially, every node form
a group of an only member with association priority as the
3-tuple (tree depth = 0,tree weight = member weight, GL
weight = member weight). Therefore, at the beginning, the
groups with highest association priority within their
neighborhoods are [3], [6] and [7]. The remaining groups
wait for them: [1] waits for [7]; [2] for [4]; [4] for [6]; and
[5] for [7].
[3] requests association with [1], [6] with [5], and [7]
with [5]. [5] confirms the request received from [7] to
associate in the group [7,5] (tree depth = 1, tree
weight = 12, GL weight = 7). Both report the action to
their current neighboring groups: [5] reports to [1], [6] and
[4]; and [7] to [1].
[6] is now the group with highest association priority
in its neighborhood and requests association with the
next one, [4]. [4] acknowledges and both are associated
in the group [6, 4] (tree depth = 1, tree weight = 10,
GL weight = 6). Both report it to their neighboring
groups: [6] reports to [7, 5]; and [4] to [7, 5], [2] and
[1].
Finally, the neighboring group of [1] with highest
association priority is [3], so [1] acknowledges the previous
request, both associate in the group [3, 1] (tree depth = 1,
tree weight = 4, GL weight = 3) and report the action to
their current neighboring groups: [1] reports to [6, 4] and
[7, 5].
3.2.1.2 Second iteration At this moment, the groups with
highest association priority in their neighborhoods are [2]
and [7, 5] (see Fig. 4). The rest waits: [6, 4] waits for [2];
and [3, 1] for [7, 5].
[2] and [7, 5] request association to [6, 4]. [6, 4]
acknowledges to [2], both form a new group [6, 4, 2] (tree
depth = 2, tree weight = 12, GL weight = 6) and report
to their neighboring groups [7, 5] and [3, 1].
Now [7, 5] requests association with [3, 1], which is its
current neighboring group with highest association priority.
[3, 1] acknowledges, both form a new group [7, 5, 3, 1]
(tree depth = 2, tree weight = 16, GL weight = 7) and
report it to their neighboring group [6, 4, 2].
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3.2.1.3 Third iteration Finally (see Fig. 5), in iteration 3,
[7, 5, 3, 1] acknowledges association to [6, 4, 2], a unique
logical KEK tree is generated and the protocol is over.
Now the group of sensors has created a new logical
binary tree of KEKs, the previous SEK is discarded and the
new one is K0,0.
4 Managing member leavings/losses/expulsions
When a sensor node leaves the group, in order to guarantee
backward secrecy, the SEK (and consequently the
compromised tree KEKs) must be updated. When the
member voluntarily leaves (due to e.g. battery exhaustion),
it notifies its leave to its sibling (the node hanging from the
same node of the tree) or, if it does not exist, the leader (GL)
of the sub-tree hanging from the first sibling node of the
leaving member in a leaf-root way. The node in charge of
initiating the rekeying process is called rekeying master
(RM). If the member just crashes or it is compromised, any
member detecting it broadcasts its leave in order to notify it
to its RM. As aforementioned, detecting misbehavior, mal-
function or impersonation of a node is another branch of
research, complementary to the study of GKM, which is out
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Fig. 2 Flowchart of a node during the creation of the secure group
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of the scope of this protocol. GKM provides with methods to
safely expel the member once it has been detected.
Once the leaving process is started, the RM deletes every
spare node and consequently moves itself or its subtree.
Then, the RM updates its key and regenerates all the keys in
its path to the root. Next, the RM securely communicates
with every leader (GL) of the subtrees hanging from the
sibling nodes of the leaving member by means of hop-by-
hop encryption with the pre-established pairwise keys. After
that, the RM sends to the GLs the needed new blinded keys
to reconstruct the tree. After receiving the blinded keys, each
involved GL sends them to the rest of members in its subtree
encrypted with the subtree root key. Now every member in
the tree regenerates the tree keys in its path to the root and a
new SEK K0,0 is assumed. At this moment all compromised
keys have been updated and the leaving process is finished
with a total of just 1 ? 2(L - 1) messages, with L = log2
N for the case of a balanced binary tree with N members or
leaves.
For the sake of clarity, Fig. 6 shows an example of the
leaving process in which member 2 leaves a group of 8
members and member 5 assumes the role of RM and
proceed with the group rekeying.
Notice that, in order to create the secure sessions, the
rekeying messages must use hop-by-hop encryption by
means of the pairwise keys. Hop-by-hop encryption is
more costly than hop-by-hop authentication by means of
the SEK, but, in our protocol, such operations are reduced
to create secure channels with every leader (GL) of the
subtrees hanging from the sibling nodes of the leaving
member whenever a sensor node leaves the group or is
expelled from it. As seen in Fig. 6, the number of these
GLs is equal to the actual depth of the RM in the tree,
which, in the case of a balanced tree, is only log2N being N
the amount of members/sensors of the group.
5 Managing new member joinings
When the base station wants to insert a new node in the
network, it preloads it with the previous unused hash of the
Fig. 3 Creation of a secure group: 1st iteration
Fig. 4 Creation of a secure group: 2nd iteration
Fig. 5 Creation of a secure group: 3rd iteration
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group key. That is to say, assuming that the node is the i-th
joining, the base station preloads it with Kg
k-i where Kg
k-i?1
is the hash of Kg
k-i as in expression (1). When the new node
is deployed it authenticates itself by means of broadcasting
its preloaded key and the rest of nodes check the new join
by computing the hash of the preloaded key. After the node
is authenticated, the rekeying process is similar as it is for a
member leaving. First, the node sends its blinded key to the
chosen RM. Then, the RM adds a new leaf to the tree (for
the new member) moving itself if necessary. After that, the
RM updates its key and regenerates all the KEKs in its path
to the root. Next, the RM securely sends then necessary
blinded KEKs to the rest of member encrypted with the
previous shared tree KEKs. After receiving the blinded
keys, every member in the tree regenerates the tree keys in
its path to the root and a new SEK K 00;0 is assumed. Once
again we illustrate such behavior with the example of
Fig. 7 where member 9 joins the group and the RM is
member 5.
6 Evaluation
The target of the following simulations is to show the
goodness of the presented protocol for large groups of
unattended devices in terms of protocol latency and
required messages. As previously mentioned, a GKM
protocol provides with a very efficient rekeying mechanism
that makes up for the extra cost due to add security to the
group creation. The originality of this work is to provide a
method to create the secure group thus allowing very
efficient rekeying in an unattended, low-cost and secure
manner.
Once the secure group is established, the rekeying effi-
ciency of our proposal is that for the tree-based algorithms,
which has been widely studied [4, 13, 14]. The only main
difference with these proposals is that in our proposal every
time there is a rekeying, the cost if assumed by a different
node (the corresponding RM) instead of a fixed one.
The main problem with tree-based algorithms is that, as
time goes by, the tree can get unbalanced due to new join-
ings/leavings (especially in the presence of burst). Several
proposal have dealt with improving the efficiency by pro-
viding batch rekeying, e.g. [28] instead of single rekeying.
Batch processing in our proposal will lead to similar results.
Consequently, since the rekeying process have been already
thoroughly covered in the literature, this section just focus
on analyzing the costs of creating the secure group. How-
ever, the costs of rekeying are presented in Sect. 8 in com-
parison with other GKM protocols in the literature.
Since the effect of the underlying technologies, shad-
owing and multipath is so specific to a given scenario, a
specific evaluation couldn’t be extrapolated to others. This
is why we provided an evaluation at the application layer.
In a real scenario, added cost due to the underlying tech-
nologies and specific environment should be added; link
frames are usually retransmitted and sometimes there is a
chance of outage nodes. Our protocol is resistant to this due
to isolated nodes are treated as leaving members (they have
no communication at all with any other member). Section 7
Fig. 6 An example of leaving process
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provides a methodology in order to match this evaluation
with a given technology and scenario assumptions.
In the following we evaluate the process of creating the
logical tree of KEKs (see Sect. 3.2) with the conditions in
Sect. 6.1 and obtain as outputs: (1) the depth of the created
tree (Sect. 6.2), which gives us an indicator of the posterior
efficiency in terms of rekeying of the created secure group;
(2) the required number of rounds for creating the secure
group (Sect. 6.3); (3) the average and maximum number of
received messages by any group member during the crea-
tion of the tree (Sect. 6.4); and (4) the necessary trans-
mitted messages in order to create the group (Sect. 6.5).
The expected results are: a tree that is almost balanced, a
bearable time to create the group, and a limited or mini-
mized amount of received/transmitted messages.
6.1 Simulation conditions
We have implemented an API of the node operation (see
Fig. 2) that can be loaded in a real sensor mote or in a
simulated device. However, since practical evaluation of
large groups of sensor nodes (hundred to thousands) is out
of our extent, we have adopted the latter approach. The API
defines the exchange and processing of network layer
packets; we have decided not to define an actual MAC/
PHY layer since we wanted to evaluate the protocol
independently of the underlying wireless physical medium.
Nevertheless, we have provided in Sect. 7 a methodology
to match this results in a physical technology such as IEEE
802.15.4.
For the simulation, we have adopted the following
assumptions:
• All the group nodes have the same characteristics in
terms of computational power and transmission/recep-
tion range. The range is assumed to be circular surface
with radius q fixed to 20 m.
• The weight of a node is defined to be a unique identifier
of a node and thus we have randomly chosen unique
identifiers for every node; the highest the identifier, the
greater the weight.
• We place from 10 to 1,000 sensor nodes according to a
random uniform distribution over a square area that
varies from 50 9 50 to 50 9 50 square meters (m2).
• All the obtained values are averaged from 30 iterations
of the protocol.
Before continuing with the evaluation of the protocol,
for the sake of clarity, we define a normalized density d as
the density relative to the station range as in (4), with M the
length of each of the sides of the square deploying area,
and N the number of stations within that area. The nor-
malized density gives us a reliable approximation of the
number of stations within the range area of a specific sta-
tion (including itself).
d ¼ N  p  q
2
M  M ð4Þ
Figure 8 shows an area of 200 9 200 m2 containing
numbers of sensor nodes (32, 100, 1,000), which correspond
to densities of 800, 2,500 and 25,000 stations/km2
respectively and normalized densities of approximately
1.00, 3.14 and 31.41. Blue circles show the range of a given
Fig. 7 An example of joining process
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sensor node and aid to notice the approximately number of
sensors within its range (that actually correspond to d).
6.2 Tree depth
Secure groups based on logical key trees reach maximum
efficiency when the tree is balanced [14]. In such cases, the
tree depth is log2 N, which is, in turn, the minimum number
of messages needed for rekeying.
Figure 9a shows the tree depth achieved by the protocol
with different numbers of nodes and over different areas.
As per the figure, when a single logical tree is achieved,
tree depth is always greater than the ideal depth log2
N (represented as a blue line). Values of depth less than the
optimal are generated when instead of a single group/tree,
two or more isolated groups are created. Figure 9 clearly
denotes that this situation is with high probability avoided
for d C 5.
As expected, for d C 5, the tree depth increases loga-
rithmically with the number of stations and the created
logical trees are very close to being balanced (depth of log2
N). In fact, the created trees only differ from the ideal
balanced tree by at most two levels (the achieved tree depth
2 ½log2 N; 2 þ log2 N). This expected behavior comes
from the protocol design guidelines that prioritize trees
with the least depth for association. This ensures that the
smallest trees do not remain without association for more
rounds than necessary and that differences in tree depth
cannot increase beyond one or two levels.
N ¼ A
p  q2d ð5Þ
Figure 9b shows the number of nodes versus the node
range radius q for a fixed area A = 1 km2 as per expression
(5). Since, as previously stated, we need a d C 5, if we
randomly deploy 1,000 sensor nodes over such area, sensor
nodes will need at least an average range of 40 m. On the
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other hand, for 4000 sensor nodes, the necessary range
radius is reduced to 20 m. Therefore, as per expression (5)
one can obtain a reliable approximation of the necessary
amount of sensor nodes to deploy over a given area for a
given node range. Or the other way around, an entity
deploying the network should be aware of these since it
provides it with a reliable estimation of the necessary
transmission power for the devices under the given
environment conditions. This prior deployment study will
hopefully avoid wasting of precious energy.
6.3 Number of rounds
A round is defined as the necessary time taken by a node to
receive messages, process them, consequently take a decision
and send a message that announces this decision. The election
of using rounds instead of directly evaluating spent time rely
on the great variety of underlying technologies, protocols
and/or setups that actually affect the necessary time. In fact,
time highly depends on the frequency of operation, the
modulation, the medium access control protocol and/or the
error control method. Moreover, the lifetime of a sensor
network is often split into equal periods of time made of an
active time and an idle time. This period will determine the
elapsed time between current and future operations besides of
the really necessary time for processing them [1].
From the above reasoning we have adopted the approach
of measuring time in terms of rounds, which, gives us the
liberty to measure time regardless of the underlying spe-
cific features. Moreover, once obtained the right measure
of elapsed time per round for a given scenario, the number
of rounds provides us with an upper limit of the real time
that the protocol spends in establishing a secure group.
Figure 10a shows the mean and variance with each
combination of areas and numbers of stations. Figure 10b
is a three-dimensional representation in which we have
marked lines that show the different values of the nor-
malized density d. Both figures are obtained by simulation
of the protocol under the conditions in Sect. 6.1. From
these figures, one can denote that the execution time is a
combination of two factors: (1) a linear growth O(N) with
the number of stations for a fixed area (that is, linear
growth with density); and (2) a logarithmic growth O(log2
N) with the number of stations for a fixed density. Obvi-
ously, the former, which is lineal, grows faster than the
latter. This linear growth derives from the sequential
behavior of the protocol regarding every neighbor. If the
neighborhood is very large (high density) the sequence will
also be very large. Consequently, from this point of view, it
is preferable to have the lowest possible density but guar-
antying the group connectivity (d C 5). Therefore, in order
to maintain the efficiency of the protocol we should control
the deployment density. In other words, if we need to
include more members in the group we will have to dis-
tribute the group across a larger area or use nodes with less
transmission/reception range.
We shall now explain this behavior in greater detail by
analytically getting to similar results. We define the nor-
malized area as a ¼ Aprange ; so we can express the nor-
malized density as d ¼ Na :
Following the protocol guidelines, in every phase, the
depth of the created trees increases by 1 and the number of
GLs is a half until only one remains (an only tree). As a
result, the number of phases is equal to depth of the final
tree, that assuming that the protocol leads to a balanced
tree, will be log2 N.
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Fig. 10 Rounds in establishing the secure group. a Mean and variance. b 3D mean
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Following the protocol guidelines, in every phase, all the
sets of neighboring GLs take actions sequentially. As a
result, the last one associating will have to wait first for its
m neighboring GLs. Considering that the number of rounds
needed to complete an association process is 2 and that 1
more round is spent to report it to the neighboring GLs, we
can assure that a total of b m ? 3 rounds are needed to
complete a phase, where b C 1 is the mean number of
rounds that every neighbor GL waits for GLs in other
neighborhoods. Thus, considering that the protocol leads to
a balanced tree, the total rounds can be expressed as in (6).
r ¼
Xlog2ðNÞ1
i¼0
mibþ 3ð Þ ð6Þ
At the beginning of the protocol, consider phase 0, every
member is a GL of a tree with an only member;
consequently, every GL has an averaged neighborhood of
d GLs (including itself); thus its m0 = d. In the next phase,
phase 1, the GLs (now leading groups of two members) are
a half, but they have at most a double of neighbors, that is
to say, that they have approximately the same amount of
neighboring GLs. As a result, for the sake of clarity, we
assume m1 continue being approximately m1 = m0 = d, and
so on with every iteration. However, in the final phases, the
total number of GLs can be less than the value of d (until
get just one GL) and so m = d; notice that there can be just
two GLs at the last phase, 4 at the last but one, and so on.
Considering that the protocol leads to a balanced tree, the
number of neighboring GLs m can be analytically
approximated as in (7) with i 2 ½0; log2 N  1 the current
phase of the protocol.
mi ¼ d if 2
i  d
2i if 2i\d

ð7Þ
From the previous reasoning, replacing (7) in (6), the
total spent rounds can be denoted as in (8).
r ¼ 3 log2 N þ
Xlog2 d1
i¼0
b2i þ
Xlog2 N1
i¼log2 d
bd
¼ 3 log2 N þ bd 1 þ log2
N
d
 
 b
ð8Þ
In order to compare (8) with the results obtained by
simulation, we replace d = N/a in (8) in order to obtain a
straight line with a slope of m ¼ b 1þlog2 að Þa as in (9).
Figure 11a represents (9) with the same parameters as in
the simulation. As expected, the analytical results
(Fig. 11a) are fairly similar to the ones obtained by
simulation (Fig. 10a).
r ¼ 3 log2 N þ b
N
a
1 þ log2 að Þ  b
¼ b 1 þ log2 að Þ
a|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
m
N þ 3 log2 N  b
ð9Þ
Until now we have evaluated the rounds spent for cre-
ating a secure group over a fixed area varying the density
(the number of deployed sensor nodes). However, it is also
very important to analyze the scalability of the protocol for
a fixed density over a varying area. With such a purpose, let
us re-express (8) as in (10), which clearly denotes a loga-
rithmic increase in the number of rounds when d is a
constant (see Fig. 11b). This conclusion is particularly
relevant to our protocol because it indicates that the
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protocol is also scalable in terms of covering a wider area
deploying more sensor nodes but keeping a fixed density.
r ¼ ð3 þ bdÞ log2 N þ bd 1  log2 dð Þ  b ð10Þ
It is important to note that limiting d should not make
more difficult the process of establishing the group key. If
the density is too high, we can reduce it by: (1) expanding
the group over a larger area; (2) reducing the number of
members; and (3) choosing, as aforementioned, nodes with
less transmission power (range) before the deployment in
order to avoid the waste of precious energy.
As previously stated at the beginning of this section, the
aim of using round measurements is to provide an upper
limit to the time spent for the creation of the group
regardless of the underlying technologies, protocols, set-
ups, etc. For example, in 802.15.4 [18] a PPDU frame is at
most 133 bytes and the transmission rate is at least
20 Kbps, thus a frame would be transmitted in at most
1338
20103 ¼ 53:2 ms. Assuming, a sensor mote with at least a
4 MHz CPU and that we can parallelize transmission/
reception tasks with processing, we could select a very
over-sized value of a round of e.g. 1 s, which will be time
enough to receive a few frames, process them and send a
message. As a result, as denoted in Fig. 11b, it takes only
160 rounds (just 2 or 3 min) to create a very large unat-
tended group of 100,000; and this is a perfectly assumable
time for low-rate networks such as WSNs.
6.4 Received messages
The cost of receiving a wireless message is less than an
typically half of the cost of transmitting it, e.g. 28.6 lJ/byte
against 59.2 lJ/byte for Mica2dot sensor mote at 3 V and
5 dBm transmit power [35]. As a result, we have also
analyzed it. Figure 12a, b represent the average and max-
imum number of messages received by a node. One can
clearly denote that the number of necessary average
received messages for appropriate deployment densities
ðd 2 ½6; 10Þ is approximately between 20 and 40 messages
even during the creation of a large secure group of 1,000
members; and the maximum received messages is
approximately between 80 and 120 messages. Simulation
results, once again, denote a bearable cost in terms of
received messages.
These figures are deliberately focused on the values
around standard values of normalized density d in order to
show the goodness of the protocol. However, the actual
complete shape would have a fast growth with d as the
reflected results in Fig. 10b. And this is important because
it clearly denotes that this protocol can lead to exhaustion
for very dense networks. This is the expected behavior
since one message is received (either a req_msg or an
ack_msg or a report_msg) in every round, and these mes-
sages are the result of a decision. As decisions are taken
sequentially in every neighborhood then, at a first stage,
rounds have a linear dependency with d. As a consequence,
one can conclude that the protocol is not optimized to high
density networks but to standards deployment where every
node has an average from 6 to 10 nodes within its range;
actually desired values for multihop sensor networks
(unattended networks preclude the existence of a base
station) [24], by the way.
6.5 Sent messages
One of the main aims of this proposal is to minimize the
number of messages that a given node must send. This is
very important because the transmission of a bit is by far
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Fig. 12 Number of received messages during the creation of the group. a Average received msgs. b Maximum received msgs by a node
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(up to three orders of magnitude more than processing
[24]) the more energy consumption process.
Figure 13a shows the average number of messages sent
by a node during the execution of the protocol. It can be
clearly seen that the protocol converges to an upper limit of
eight messages. We can explain this behavior analytically
because the number of nodes sending messages (current
GLs) is reduced by half during each iteration. In this case,
there is a special initial phase in which each of the N nodes
sends a message; associations are then repeated until a
single logical key tree is constructed. Since associations are
configured in pairs, the number of GLs is reduced by half in
each iteration.
If we denote l as the average number of messages sent
by a GL during each iteration, we can denote the average
number of messages M sent by a node as in (11). If we
apply the limit for large values of N to this expression, we
can reformulate it as in (12). Since, for the case of a bal-
anced tree, l ^ 3.5, one clearly denote that expression in
(12) clearly reflects the same behavior as the simulated
results (Fig. 13a).
M ¼ 1
N
N þ Nlþ N
2
lþ N
4
lþ    þ l
 
¼ 1 þ l
Xlog2 N1
i¼0
1
2
 i
¼ 1 þ 2l 2 l
N
ð11Þ
lim
N!1
M ¼ 1 þ 2l ð12Þ
Figure 13b shows the behavior of the increase in the
maximum number of messages sent by a member of the
group for different areas and numbers of nodes. We can
deduce from the figure that the maximum number of sent
messages increases with log2 N. Note that the node that
sends the most messages is the final GL; it will therefore
send messages during each of the dlog2 Ne iterations.
Since l messages are sent per iteration, we can determine
that the node will send dlog2 1000e  3:5  35 messages for
1,000 members (with l ^ 3.5), which matches the
simulation results in Fig. 13b.
At this point it is useful to recall that: (1) with a trivial
solution, the key server uses N messages to establish the
group key and N messages for rekeying; (2) with LKH, the
key server uses N messages to establish the group key and
O(log2 N) messages for rekeying; and (3) with our pro-
posal, the node that sends the most messages only
sends l * log2 N when the group key is established and, as
with any other tree-based algorithm, O(log2 N) messages
for the rekeying process. Moreover, with our protocol
every node in the group only sends an average of 1 ? 2l
messages due to the distribution of the GKM tasks which is
a very valuable property in UWSNs.
7 Obtaining energy costs in a typical 802.15.4 scenario
The aim of this section is to show the proposed protocol’s
goodness in terms of energy consumption in a real sce-
nario. With such purpose, we have adopted the IEEE
802.15.4 [18] technology, which is one of the most
extended technologies for sensor networks. Next we
defined the scenario assumptions.
Figure 14 shows an example of frame structure using
symmetric cryptography. At PHY layer, we have assumed
popular 2.4 GHz operation of IEEE 802.15.4 leading to a 5
bytes (10 4-bit symbols) long synchronization header and a
1 byte (or 2 symbols) long PHY header. These fields are
followed by a variable length (up to 127 bytes) PHY
payload. At MAC layer, we use short addressing (2 bytes
per address) since we can assume that a give node will not
0
500
1000
0x0
250x250
500x500
0
10
20
30
40
statio
ns
area (m2)
m
a
x 
se
n
t m
es
sa
ge
s
δ=1
δ=2
δ=3
δ=4
δ=5
δ=6
δ=7
δ=8
δ=9
δ=10
0
500
1000
0x0
250x250
500x500
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
stat
ions
area (m2)
a
vg
 s
en
t m
es
sa
ge
s
δ=1
δ=2
δ=3
δ=4
δ=5
δ=6
δ=7
δ=8
δ=9
δ=10
(a) (b)
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have more than 216 one-hop neighbors. Further, we have
assumed a secure deployment where AES-CBC-MAC with
128 bits keys is used for authenticating the radio link.
Moreover, we have adopted 6LowPAN [17] with com-
pressed UDP/IPv6 headers of 10 bytes. For key manage-
ment, the transmitted KEKs are securely sent using AES-
CCM (Encryption ? Authentication) with 128 bits shared
keys. Consequently, as shown in Fig. 14, from 16 to 88
bytes can be used for key management data with symmetric
cryptography. A similar approach may be done for asym-
metric cryptography. For more details about the frame
format fields, we refer the reader to [18].
Obviously, the energy costs for transmitting a given
frame will rely not only on the actual frame length but also
on the average number of transmissions Ntxðc; FÞ needed to
ensure a successful reception for a given average reception
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) c and a frame length of F bytes.
We next assume that an ACK packet can be successfully
transmitted in a single attempt. This assumption relies on
the fact that ACK packets are much smaller and hence
much likelier to go through, and on temporal channel
correlation which ensures that, if the data packet experi-
enced a good channel, the return path should experience
the same beneficial channel conditions. Therefore,
Ntxðc; FÞ can be approximated as in (13), where PEPðFÞ is
the packet error probability (PEP) of a frame of F bytes.
Ntxðc; FÞ  1
1  PEPðFÞðcÞ ð13Þ
Usually, in order to characterize the average number of
retransmissions, three wireless operating conditions are
distinguished [33]: (1) fast fading where the Nakagami-m
channel varies from symbol to symbol (ergodic over
packet); (2) block fading where the channel remains
constant over a packet but changes from packet to packet
(ergodic over retransmission window); and (3) fading
where the channel remains constant over time but varies in
space (non-ergodic). Details of how to analytically model
the three conditions in IEEE 802.15.4 are presented in [3].
We will however subsequently only consider the former
case with block channel coder, although the analysis and
insights for the other cases would be very similar. In this
case, the average number of transmissions under fast
Nakagami-m fading conditions with block channel coder
can thus be expressed [3] as in (14), where k is the uncoded
number of information bits in the code word and t the
number of errors which can be corrected by the code. The
constants g and h depend on the choice of modulation and
modulation order M, but are defined as g ¼ ð1=ðmaxð2;
log2 MÞ
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
p ÞÞCðm þ 1=2Þ=Cðm þ 1Þ; h ¼ sin2ðp=MÞ for
M-PSK. The value of c is obtained as c ¼ 1=ððt þ 1ÞBðt þ
1; J  tÞÞ being Bðx; yÞ the Beta function and J the word
length in bits.
Ntxðc; FÞ  1  c g m
m þ hc
 m tþ1 !F8k
ð14Þ
In 802.15.4 at 2.4 GHz every 4-bit symbol (k = 4) is
encoded into a sequence of 32 chips (J = 32) that are
actually transmitted over the air; that is to say that l bytes will
actually require to send 2l 4-bit symbols that finally leads to
transmit 2l 32-bits chip sequences or 8l bytes. The minimum
distance between two chip sequences is 12 bits and thus we
can assume t = 5. As per [18], the 2.4 GHz PHY shall
employ direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) with offset
quadrature phase-shift keying (O-QPSK) for chip
modulation. Therefore, we can assume M = 4. As in
O-QPSK, average reception SNR should be at least 12.5dB
in order to consider a neighbor within the transmitter range
(bit error rate less than 5 %), we define c ¼ 12:5dB as the
most restrictive case. Finally, as stated in [27], the Nakagami
factor can be approximated as a deterministic factor m &
1.19 for this scenario assuming outdoor measurements.
For details about how to analyze the effect of shadowing
on c and thus to the density deployment we refer the authors
to [3]. Shadowing will increase the probability of some
nodes being isolated from the rest of the group. It worths
mentioning here, that this will not break the protocol. Quite
Fig. 14 The proposed frame format
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the opposite, it will create several secure groups of inter-
connected devices, which is the desired behavior.
Next we present real estimations of the energy costs
when the sensor network is made up of Berkeley/Crossbow
Mica2dots with Atmel ATmega128L 8-bit micro-control-
ler, which is a popular platform for WSN research. This
platform was analyzed in [35] and the authors obtained
energy consumption for individual cryptographic algo-
rithms and data transmission/reception with less than a 5 %
deviation by measuring the current drawn from the power
supply. Table 1 extracts the useful data for this analysis,
that is to say the costs of transmission, reception, AES-128
encryption, AES-128 decryption, RSA-1024 signature
creation and RSA-1024 signature verification.
It is interesting to note that the power required to
transmit 1 byte is more than one order of magnitude greater
than the cost of encrypting/decrypting it using symmetric
cryptography. This is not the case of asymmetric cryp-
tography that not only creates bigger frames (besides the
added signature length, output is a multiple of the key) but
also has 3-order of magnitude greater power consumption.
This fact suggests to use symmetric cryptography when-
ever it is possible.
With asymmetric cryptography, we can neglect trans-
mission costs with respect to signature creation and verifi-
cation. Therefore, we can obtain a lower bound of the cost of
transmitting a key management packet as the cost of creating
the signature, and of reception as the cost of verifying it.
Quite the opposite, with symmetric cryptography, cryp-
tographic operations incur negligible costs with respect to
sending/transmitting data. Consequently, and taking into
account that key management data must be a multiple of
16bytes because of the use of 128-AES-CCM, the cost of
transmitting/receiving the necessary key management data
with symmetric cryptography can be obtained as in (15) and
(16), being L the amount of bytes to be sent, - ¼ 45 þ 16 
L mod 80 the size of the last frame in bytes, s the cost of
transmitting 1 byte and rho the cost of receiving 1 byte.
etxðLÞ ¼ L
80
	 

125Ntxðc; 125  8Þ þ -Ntxðc;-  8Þ
 
s
ð15Þ
erxðLÞ ¼ L
80
	 

125Ntxðc; 125  8Þ þ -Ntxðc;-  8Þ
 
q
ð16Þ
It can be clearly denoted the weak impact of our
proposal in a real scenario. During the creation of the
group, every key management data packet will fit in a
single frame. As a result the cost of sending and receiving a
packet will be respectively eTxð16Þ  3:61 mJ and
eRxð16Þ  1:75 mJ: For example the average energy cost
per node when creating the secure group of 1,000 nodes
under good density conditions (from 6 to 10 neighbor
nodes) can be approximated by the amount of necessary
received and transmitted bytes (see Figs. 12b, 13b) that is
to say that it will be less than 40eRxð16Þ þ 8eRxð16Þ 
98:72 mJ per node with a global impact of just 98.72 J.
As explained in Sects. 5 and 4, when a node joins, leaves
or it is expelled from the group, the specific node chosen as
RM sends log2 Nd e messages, with a varying number of
KEKs, that are actually forwarded by the GLs, as a result
the nodes spending more energy are the RM and the GLs (a
total of log2 Nd e). This represent a cost of
P log2 Nd e
i¼1 eTxð16 	
iÞ  97:47 mJ for each of them, and a global impact eG as
in (17) of approximately 1.97J.
eG ¼ eTxð16Þ þ
Xlog2 Nd e
i¼1
2eTxð16 	 iÞ þ eRxð16 	 iÞð Þ
þ N  log2 Nd e  1ð ÞeRxð16Þ ð17Þ
Assuming that every sensor of the network has a packet
rate ! and a rate of new joinings/leavings of U; the
percentage of the consumption of the rekeying process with
respect to the global operation of the WSN is then:
UeG
N! eTxð16Þ þ eRxð16Þð Þ ð18Þ
which, under the same conditions as before, is approxi-
mately 0:368 U !. Obviously, if the packet rate is much
higher than the dynamism of the group, as we expect in a
WSN, the global impact of rekeying is very low. For
example, assuming a packet rate of one packet (e.g. a
measure) every 30 s and a rate of new/leaving nodes of 1
node every day, the costs of rekeying is only 0.13 % of the
global operation.
A similar approach can be carried in order to find the
costs associated to this and other proposals in this and
another scenarios. We have however computed the costs as
in this section for every other proposal in the comparison
provided in the next section. Obtained costs are shown in
Table 2 in braces.
8 Comparison with other protocols
We will next compare the communication costs of our
protocol with other widely known proposals with a similar
goal. We have chosen representative proposals based on
Table 1 Energy costs with Mica2dots ATmega128L
Tx (s) Rx (q) AES128
enc.
AES128
dec.
RSA1024
sig.
RSA1024
ver.
59:2 lJ
byte
28:6 lJ
byte
1:62 lJ
byte
2:49 lJ
byte
304 mJ 11.9 mJ
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clusters [21], logical trees of keys [10, 15, 19] or ring
structures [32]. All the proposals achieve not only the
creation of a secure group but also how to secure it when
the membership changes. Table 2 summarizes the main
features of these proposals. Moreover, we provide with a
quantitative comparison of the aspects that have the
deepest impact in the performance of a GKM protocol: the
total messages for the group creation, the rounds for the
group creation, the sent messages for batch rekeying and
the sent messages when forced rekeying. Energy costs in
braces have been obtained, just for reference purposes, by
applying the methodology in Sect. 7 to a group of 1,000
sensor nodes. These costs account for both sending and
receiving the messages.
The main target of providing such table is to provide a
comparison between the most important aspects that affect
the efficiency of a GKM protocol. As a result, in Table 2,
we classify the presented proposals into:
• Topology: if the group is organized in clusters, trees of
keys or rings structures. Cluster based proposals first
split the management domain into smaller areas or
clusters, each one leaded by a clusterhead; once the
clusters are created, in decentralized proposals, the
clusterheads share the rekeying task when the mem-
bership changes. Proposals based on logical trees of
keys create a logical backbone of shared keys that
actually makes rekeying easier and more efficient.
Proposals based on ring structures rely on group key
agreement algorithms where the future groupwise key
passes through each and every node before is agreed; its
main drawback for large groups is that getting to a ring
structure is usually not that easy.
• Unattended: specifies if the group is able by itself to
self-organize and maintain security without attended
operation (e.g. a base station).
• Decentralized: whether there is an only entity or node
in charge of managing security or it is shared by a set of
members.
• Asymmetric cryptography: reflects if the proposal
requires the use o asymmetric cryptography in order
to achieve group security. Note that its use is costly and
many times not affordable for WSNs.
• Total msgs. for the group creation: approximately
presents the required total number of transmitted
messages in order to initially create the secure group
or to entirely recreate it (backbone reset). Here we
measure all the messages in the network and not the
average messages per node. In the case of decentralized
unclustered proposals, obtaining the average messages
per node is fairly straightforward: it is just the total
messages divided by the number of nodes N (the
average sent messages for our proposal is detailed in
Sect. 6.5). In the case of clustered proposals, almost all
of the total transmitted messages are sent by the
clusterheads and then obtaining the average would not
be a representative parameter.
• Rounds for the group creation: as already defined in
Sect. 6.3, the rounds provide us with an estimation of
the required time in order to completely create a secure
group that does not depend on the underlying technol-
ogies and protocols.
• Total msgs. for batch rekeying: the necessary transmit-
ted messages for standard (policy required or periodic)
updates of the group key.
• Total msgs. when forced rekeying: required total
transmitted messages when a rekeying is forced
because of a member joining or leaving the group.
Table 2 clearly shows that the protocols based on tree
topologies are the ones performing best in terms of nec-
essary messages for rekeying: they achieve an efficiency of
O(log2 N) instead of O(N) in terms of necessary transmitted
messages. On the other hand, centralized tree-based pro-
tocols such as LKHW are the fastest in terms of group
creation since they have a centralized manager that actually
imposes the tree structure instead of a set of nodes that
have to cooperate to create the secure group. Obviously,
when computing costs, there are important differences
between proposal using symmetric and asymmetric cryp-
tography during the message exchange.
Assuming a (required) decentralized approach for an
unattended network, regarding to the creation of the secure
group, we can conclude that: (1) our protocol under best
conditions (the deployment area increases as new nodes are
added—fixed density) spends only O(log2 N) rounds, while
in the worst conditions (fixed area and thus the density
increases as new nodes are added) gets to O(N) which is a
similar value than the obtained with the other decentralized
approaches; (2) the total transmitted messages for the
group creation is, as for the other approaches, O(N),
although the cost are much shared by the group members
and a single entity will send at most O(log2 N) messages
(see Sect. 6.5).
On the other hand, regarding the cost of rekeying, from
Table 2 we can clearly denote that, besides using lighter
symmetric cryptography, as the other tree-based proposals,
the necessary transmitted messages are limited to only
O(log2 N).
Summarizing, TGDH is the only proposal that achieves
the same global performance as ours. However, [15] and this
proposal are able to create the secure group faster, with less
messages and less energy consumption. As a result, they are
able to better recover against a mass disconnection (new
group creation). Moreover, this proposal, as it does not rely
at all on asymmetric cryptography, has substantially reduced
64 Wireless Netw (2013) 19:47–67
123
the energy consumptions (see example of costs in braces).
As a result, we can conclude that our proposal is perfectly
suited to UWSN and especially for those made of low-end
devices with computational constraints.
9 Conclusions
In this document we have presented a GKM protocol tar-
geted to UWSNs. In keeping with the special requirements
of these networks, it has been designed to be performed by
a group of unattended low-end devices cooperating in a
completely distributed and decentralized manner. There-
fore, the main target of the protocol has been to minimize
the added costs due to GKM. In this work, we have pre-
sented the protocol’s operation when a new secure group is
formed, as well as when it resolves membership changes.
Our protocol achieves the scalability of tree-based GKM
solutions while being completely distributed and not rely-
ing on asymmetric cryptography. We have reported simu-
lation results of the initial establishment of the secure
group. We have matched these results with an analytical
study of the protocol behavior. The results prove that the
protocol has no deadlocks, that the logical key tree formed
tends to be balanced, that the bandwidth spent in terms of
sent and received messages only grows with the logarithm
of the number of members of the group, and that the secure
group can be established in a limited number of rounds.
Moreover we have provided a methodology in order to
estimate the realistic energy costs with a given physical
technology. With all these results we can conclude that the
protocol is perfectly suited to large groups of sensor nodes.
Thus far, we have analyzed the number of necessary
transmitted messages but not the cost of relaying these
messages, closely related to the ad hoc routing protocol. A
cross-layer solution integrating the management of the
secure group with the routing algorithm seems to be the
appropriate way of minimizing the relaying costs, and this
is now the current and future research line of this proposal.
Moreover, how different policies of weight assignments
could actually affect the network lifetime is part of a future
line. A function to choose a random unique identifier for
every member every time the group is to be created or
recreated is fairly straightforward, but it remains to study
the effect of assigning the weights depending on node
capabilities, such as battery left.
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